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TAXATION:

TRADE OR BUSINESS? THAT Is THE QUESTION:
WHETHER FULL-TIME GAMBLING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A
TRADE OR BUSINESS FOR PURPOSES OF SECTIONS 62 AND 162 OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE-Groetzinger v. Commissioner,

771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Taxpayers covet having their income-producing activity classified
as a "trade or business" under sections 62 and 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.1 If a taxpayer's activities gain trade or business status, the
taxpayer can deduct from his or her gross income the "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses connected with his or her trade or business.2 The problem which has plagued courts for decades is how to formulate a set of standards for accurately assessing whether an incomeproducing activity is, by nature, a trade or business.3 Two criteria have
emerged for evaluating trade or business status. The first, the "goods
and services" test, focuses on the taxpayers' holding themselves out as
providing goods or services or both." The second, the "facts and circumstances" test, focuses on the total circumstances underlying the
case to determine if the income-producing activity reaches a sufficient
level of "busyness" to warrant trade or business status.5
Certain gambling activities have generated particularly difficult

I. I.R.C. § 62(I) (1982) (all Internal Revenue Code sections are codified in Title 26 of the
United States Code). Adjusted gross income equals gross income minus "[tihe deductions allowed
by this chapter ... which are attribut[ed) to a trade or business carried on by the taxpayer." Id.
(emphasis added). I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982). "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business .
I..."
Id. (emphasis added).
2. I.R.C. § 162 (1982). In contrast, if taxpayer's expenses are held to be personal, then the
taxpayer must pay taxes on his or her gross income without subtracting "personal, living, or family expenses." I.R.C. § 262 (1982). A taxpayer's expenses connected with full-time gambling are
deductible as "ordinary and necessary expenses ... for the production or collection of income."
I.R.C. § 212 (1982). Section 212 expenses, however, are subtracted from adjusted gross income
only to the extent such expenses are in excess of the taxpayer's zero bracket amount. See i.R.C. §
211 (1982). Therefore, a taxpayer's taxable income is more greatly reduced if his or her expenses
are characterized as business expenses as opposed to income-production expenses.
3. See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1984) (taxpayer did
not hold himself out as a gambler; therefore his expenses were not considered trade or business
expenses); Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1 (1975) (taxpayer used his own resources for gambling and did not hold himself out as offering a good or service at the betting window).
5. See, e.g., Meredith v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. 318 (CCH) (1984) (taxpayer allowed to
deduct full-time gambling expenses), Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362 (1983) (taxpayer in
full-time trade or business).
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cases for determining the existence of a trade or business status. The
difficult cases generally involve taxpayers who devote forty or more
hours per week attending races at a track, researching the performance
of the various entries, and placing bets.' This taxpayer gambles with
his or her own money and does not provide others with the results of
his or her research. The problem arises when the taxpayer, the Internal
Revenue Service, and eventually the courts must decide whether this
type of activity constitutes a trade or business. Under the goods and
services test, the activity is not considered a trade or business because
in placing bets only for themselves, the taxpayers are not providing a
service or supplying goods or holding themselves out as doing either.
However, when applying the facts and circumstances test, the taxpayer
appears to be devoting the time and energy characteristic of a trade or
business. It is apparent that the standard which a particular court
adopts is determinative of the status which this activity will be
7
granted.
The federal circuits courts of appeals are split as to whether the
goods and services test or the facts and circumstances test should be
8
applied when confronting the trade or business issue. In Groetzinger v.
Commissioner9 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a case
of first impression, decided to apply the facts and circumstances test.
This casenote will examine the Groetzinger court's analysis of established precedent in this area 0 and the purpose of section 62 of the
Internal Revenue Code." This note will also examine the Groetzinger
court's analogy of the full-time gambler to the high-volume short-term
trader1" and will consider whether the "facts and circumstances" test is
a workable standard.18 Finally, the merit of other arguments which
have influenced other courts when deciding the "trade or business" sta-

6. See infra note 8 for gambling cases which have reached appeals courts.
7. See supra notes 4-5.
8. The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have utilized the "goods
and services" test. E.g., Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1984); Gajewski
v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983); Noto v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.J.
1984), aff'd mem., 770 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1985). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
and the Tax Court have adopted the "facts and circumstances" test. E.g., Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985); Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362 (1983); Nipper v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. 136 (CCH) (1983), affd mem., 746 F.2d 813 (11th Cir. 1984). Each
of these cases involved the issue of whether full-time gambling is a trade or business for the
purposes of the I.R.C.
9. 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1984).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 31-59.
II. See infra text accompanying notes 60-68.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 76-79.
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tus of this type of gambling activity will be weighed."
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

After ending his employment with a private company in January
of 1978, the taxpayer dedicated almost all of his working time to betting on dog races. 15 The taxpayer normally spent between sixty and
eighty hours per week at the racetrack researching, preparing, and
placing bets.16 The taxpayer applied the results of his labor only for his
own profit; he never sold tips nor placed bets for others. 17 Having no
other profession or employment, the taxpayer was dependent upon his
gambling activities to generate the bulk of his income. His only other
source of income-interest, dividends, and sales of investments-amounted to only $6,498 during 1978.18
Because of the taxpayer's gambling activities in 1978, the taxpayer
sustained a loss of $2,032 resulting from $72,032 wagered offset by
$70,000 of winnings.1 9 The taxpayer filed a 1978 federal income tax
return in which he listed his net gambling losses on schedule E20 but
did not report his $70,000 of winnings as income."' The Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service asserted a deficiency against the taxpayer ruling that the $70,000 of winnings were gross income and that
the $70,000 of allowable gambling losses were "below the line" itemized deductions and subject to the minimum tax as in effect in 1978.22
The Tax Court ruled that there was no deficiency and held for the
taxpayer despite the Commissioner's insistence that the taxpayer's failure to hold himself out as providing goods or services should preclude
his activities from being considered a trade or business.23 The Tax
Court decision allowed the taxpayer to deduct his gambling losses as
"above the line" 2 4 deductions in arriving at adjusted gross income.2 5

14. See infra text accompanying notes 80-105.
15. Groetzinger v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 269, 270 (7th Cir. 1985).
16. Id.
17. id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The taxpayer filed a Supplemental Income Schedule (Schedule E) in which he deducted
only $70,000 of his gambling losses because gambling losses are only deductible to the extent of
gambling winnings. I.R.C. § 165(d) (1982).
21. Groetzinger 771 F.2d at 270.
22. Id. "Below the line" itemized deductions are subtracted from the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income to the extent that the deductions exceed the taxpayer's zero bracket amounts. See
I.R.C. § 211 (1982). The minimum tax on "items of tax preference" was imposed by I.R.C. §§
56-57 (1976).
23. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d at 270.
24. "Above the line" deductions are subtracted from the taxpayer's gross income in arriving
at his or her adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 21 (1982).
25. Id. Deductions from gross income are more advantageous to the taxpayer than deduc-

Published by eCommons, 1986

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 12:1

The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service appealed this
decision and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court's holding" and upheld the use of the facts and circumstances test over the goods and services test.2 7 In examining the facts
and circumstances of the case, the court of appeals focused on whether
28
the taxpayer's income-producing activities constituted his livelihood.
In finding that the income-producing activities of the taxpayer did constitute his livelihood, the court held that for purposes of sections 62 and
162 of the Internal Revenue Code the taxpayer's gambling activities
constituted a trade or business and thus, the taxpayer could deduct his
losses and his ordinary and necessary business expenses as "above the
line" deductions.

III.

BACKGROUND

The goods and services test had its genesis in the United States
Supreme Court case of Deputy v. du Pont.3 0 The taxpayer was the ben31
eficial owner of sixteen percent of the du Pont Company stock. For
the purpose of protecting his investment interest, the taxpayer thought
that the members of the company's executive committee should be
given a financial interest in the company. However, the taxpayer did
not have enough shares of stock readily assignable. Through a series of
loans from other holders of du Pont stock, the taxpayer was able to
2
secure the shares for the executive committee members.3 As a result,
the taxpayer wanted to deduct the expenses connected with the trans33
actions and loans as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
The majority of the du Pont Court ruled against the taxpayer on
the narrow ground that the expenses sought to be deducted were not
connected with the taxpayer's own income-producing activity but were
instead related to the du Pont Company's business.3" Therefore, the
status of the taxpayer's income-producing activity was never determined. In Justice Frankfurter's concurrence" he concluded that trade
or business status depends on "holding one's self out to others as en-

tions from adjusted gross income because the latter are reduced by the taxpayer's zero bracket
amount. See id.
26. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d 269, 277 (7th Cir. 1985).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 274.
29. Id. at 272-74.
30. 308 U.S. 488 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 490.
32. Id. at 490-92.
33. Id. at 492.
34. Id. at 493-94.
35. Id. at 499.
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gaged in the selling of goods or services." ' 6 Even though the majority
did not rule on the trade or business issue, Frankfurter's concurrence
has spawned a progeny of cases applying the goods and services test.3"
In 1941, one year after the du Pont opinion, the United States
Supreme Court in Higgins v. Commissioner 8 was again faced with the
trade or business issue. In Higgins the taxpayer conducted substantial
activities directed toward managing his investment affairs.3 9 The taxpayer maintained offices and staff for the purpose of coordinating his
large and diverse investments.40 The taxpayer claimed that the "elements of continuity, constant repetition, regularity and extent""' which
characterized his income-producing activity entitled his income-producing activity to trade or business status.
When deciding the Higgins case, the Supreme Court failed to confirm the goods and services test as the standard for trade or business
analysis, 42 and merely concluded that trade or business status is dependent upon the facts of each case. 43 Given the opportunity to adopt the
goods and services test, the Supreme Court instead relied on the facts
44
and circumstances test to resolve the trade or business issue. '
3
Over thirty years later, in Snow v. Commissioner," the Supreme
Court was faced with the trade or business issue in the context of section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code"6 which allows research and development deductions. Although the Supreme Court mentioned the
goods and services test, the Court concluded that the trade or business
language of section 174 should be interpreted broadly by a facts and
circumstances analysis.' 7 In addition, because section 174 has a
broader trade or business provision than section 162, a holding adopting the narrower goods and services test would have suggested an intention to use the more restrictive standard for the section 162 provision. 48

36. Id.
37. See, e.g.. Estate of Cull v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1984); Gajewski v.
Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1983); Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. i (1975), rev'd,
80 T.C. 362 (1983).
38. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
39. Id. at 213-14.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 215.
42. Id. at 217-18.
43. Id.
44. Id. "To determine whether the activities of a taxpayer are 'carrying on a business' requires an examination of the facts in each case." Id. at 217.
45. 416 U.S. 500 (1974).
46. Id. at 501. See generally 1.R.C. § 174 (1982).
47. Snow, 416 U.S. at 503 (the Court also did not decide whether the goods and services
standard should be used in conjuction with the facts and circumstances standard).
48. The facts and circumstances test is a broad standard in that it allows the trial court
more discretion in finding trade or business status. Since the goods and services test is more re-
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However, the Supreme Court did not so hold." 9
Since Snow, the Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to lay
to rest the debate over whether the goods and services or the facts and
circumstances test should be the only standard used for "trade or business" analysis. On the contrary, during the silence of the Supreme
Court, the lower courts have chosen conflicting positions so that a split
in the courts' holdings has distinctly arisen. ° Thus, the trade or business status of many taxpayers, including the taxpayer in Groetzinger, is
dependent upon the circuit in which the case is heard.51 The Groetzinger case was decided within the framework of this inconsistency, and
the reconciliation of the courts in their position on the trade or business
issue is a pressing problem in establishing uniform treatment for similarly situated taxpayers.

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Groetzinger Court's Analysis

In Groetzinger v. Commissioner,52 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit analyzed the trade or business issue. In holding for the
taxpayer and allowing ordinary and necessary trade or business expense
deductions, 53 the court first analyzed precedent dealing with the proper
standard for determining the trade or business status of any incomeproducing activity.54 The court recognized that the circuits were split
as to whether to use the goods and services test or the facts and circumstances test.5 5 While noting that Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Deputy v. du Pont56 supported the goods and services test, 7
the Groetzinger court concluded that the United States Supreme Court
has never adopted, even implicitly, the goods and services test as the
required standard58 for determining trade or business status.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit next attempted to
determine the congressional purpose behind the enactment of sections

strictive in that fewer activities will gain trade or business status under it, if a section that has a
broader trade or business provision is held to require a goods and services test, then a narrower
provision must also require a narrower test than the facts and circumstances test.
49. Snow. 416 U.S. at 500.
50. See cases cited supra note 8.
51. Id.
52. 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985).
53. Id at 274.
54. Id. at 271-72
55. Id. at 271.
56. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
57. Groeizinger. 771 F.2d at 272.
58. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/10
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6269 and 16260 of the Internal Revenue Code. After searching the legislative history of these sections, the court found little indication of congressional support for either test and could find no other conclusive
standard based upon the legislative history. 6' The court, however, did
find a key to solving the problem on the face of the statute itself.
Section 62(1) allows deductions for business or trade expenses only
when the "trade or business does not .consist of the performance of services by the taxpayer as an employee." ' 62 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reasoned from the language of section 62(1) that the
main purpose of the section was to give taxpayers who incur many expenses in the course of their trade or business a deduction.63 "The most
obvious distinction between employees and non-employees earning income is that the latter incur many expenses in earning a living or in
their occupation or livelihood that the former do not."'" The expenses
incurred by an employee are usually incidental to his livelihood and
resemble personal expenses. 6 Examples of these expenses include traveling expenses to and from work and meal expenses.66 On the other
hand, the expenses of an employer are directly related to producing the
income which represents his livelihood and are, by nature, trade or bus67
iness expenses.
Providing a narrower focus to the facts and circumstances test, the
Groetzinger court concluded that the key inquiry in determining trade
or business status is "whether certain activities of a taxpayer can fairly
be characterized as a livelihood, occupation or means of earning a
living.""
In support of its position, the court of appeals analogized the fulltime gambler to the high-volume, short-term trader.69 The court recognized that long-term investment, like casual gambling, is generally a
personal activity designed to preserve the income already gained from
the taxpayer's livelihood. 70 High-volume, short-term trading, like fulltime gambling, however, is usually a taxpayer's means of earning a

59. Id. at 272-74. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text for the wording of the
section.
60. Id. at 272-74. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text for the wording of the
section.
61. Id. at 274.
62. Id. at 273 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 62(1) (1976)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. I.R.C. § 62(2), (8) (1982).
67. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d at 273.
68. Id. at 274.
69. Id. at 275-76.
70.byId.
at 273.
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living." The expenses incurred both in long-term investment and casual
gambling are incidental to the production of income.72 On the other
hand, the expenses incurred in high-volume, short-term trading and
73
full-time gambling are integral to the livelihood of the taxpayer.
High-volume, short-term trading has been afforded trade or business
status 7 ' and therefore, due to their key similarities, full-time gambling
should also gain trade or business status.7 5
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that
the goods and services test has not provided "clarity or simplicity" in
resolving the trade or business issue. 76 The court of appeals calculated
that the livelihood inquiry provides as much simplicity and clarity as
the goods and services test 77 and is better designed to fulfill the purpose
the goods and services
of section 62.78 Despite this assertion, however,
79
standard.
certain
more
a
test may provide
An application of each test to a slight variation of the fact pattern
present in Groetzinger0 illustrates that the court of appeal's assertion
may not be supportable. The taxpayer might have devoted less time to
gambling, thirty to forty hours per week, and had more income from
other sources, for example a part-time job in which the taxpayer
earned $6,000 per year. Application of the "livelihood" inquiry raises a
number of questions. At what point does the taxpayer stop earning a
sufficient livelihood from gambling so that his or her gambling activities are no longer considered a "trade or business?" Does the taxpayer's gambling activity have to be his only means of earning a living?
Or should the standard be predominant, substantial, or significant in
determining the extent the activity must have in providing the taxpayer's livelihood in order to determine trade or business status? The
goods and services test eliminates these considerations. Under the goods
and services test, the taxpayer's gambling activities do not constitute a
holding out to others of goods or services; therefore, the gambling activities- would automatically be disqualified from trade or business

71. Id. at 275.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See Levin v. United States 597 F.2d 760, (Ct. Cl. 1979) (taxpayer's speculation in the
stock market rose to the level of carrying on a trade or business). But see Moller v. United States,
721 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (taxpayer's activities with respect to his investments were held
insufficient to be characterized as trading and did not qualify for trade or business status); Purvis
v. Commissioner, 530 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1976) (same finding).
75. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d at 274-75.
76. Id. at 276.
77. Id. at 276-77.
78. Id.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 81-84.
80. 771 F.2d 269 at 270-71.
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status."1
The goods and services test presents a watershed which appears to
simplify trade or business determination. This approach can be effectively illustrated by comparing the full-time gambler, such as the taxpayer in Groetzinger,8 2 with the gambler who sells tips and places bets
for others. Under the facts and circumstances test and the livelihood
inquiry, both the independent gambler and the "bookie" could be considered as being involved in a trade or business. 83 The outcome would
depend upon the extent to which their activities constituted their livelihood. To decide this issue a court would have to consider many collateral issues such as the totality of the taxpayer's income-producing activities and the use to which the taxpayer put the fruit of these
activities. The goods and services test eliminates these collateral issues
and provides a more rapid means of resolving the activity's status. A
bookie holds himself or herself out as providing a service of selling tips
and placing bets; therefore, his or her activities would be considered a
trade or business. The independent, full-time gambler does not hold
himself out as providing goods or services; therefore, his activities
would not be considered a "trade or business." This comparative analysis displays how courts may achieve more rapid dispositions of cases
involving the trade or business issue.
However, as the Groetzinger court pointed out, there are two essential principles underlying the trade or business issue which make the
rapid disposition qualities of the goods and services test less persuasive
than the better-reasoned analysis provided by the facts and circumstances test and the "livelihood" inquiry. 84 The first principle is that
the taxpayer involved in a trade or business has "the good faith intent
. . . to make a profit or produce income." 85 The second principle is
that a trade or business is characterized by "continuity, repetition and
extensiveness" 8 in its income-producing activities.
B.

Good Faith Intent to Make a Profit or Produce Income

The Supreme Court of the United States confronted the first of
these principles in Higgins v. Commissioner.8" In Higgins the taxpayer
devoted extensive time and resources to managing his investments."B

81. See, e.g., Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1 (1975).
82. 771 F.2d at 270.
83. See id. at 272-74.
84. Id. at 274.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
88.eCommons,
Id. at 214. 1986
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The taxpayer rented offices and hired a staff for the sole purpose of
coordinating his extensive financial investments.8" The major expenses
of rent and salaries, as well as the active, busy nature of this incomeproducing activity, gave it the appearance of a "trade or business."
Nevertheless, the Court held that no matter how much the taxpayer's
investment activities resembled a trade or business, they were still by
nature investment, rather than trade or business, activities.90
In applying the analysis used by the Supreme Court in Higgins to
the situation of the full-time gambler, it is again helpful to consider the
analogy to the high-volume, short-term trader. While the trader of
stocks and securities may appear to be involved in merely an investment activity, the nature of high-volume, short-term trading more
closely resembles a trade or business. 9 ' A trader deals in a large number of stocks and securities and generally only possesses a given stock
or security for a very short time.92 His holding period may be as short
as ten minutes and is generally not longer than a few months. 93 This
type of activity differs significantly from the long-term investment
94
which involves a profit generated over a period of a year or longer.
The long-term investor is much more passive than the short-term investor. 95 The long-term trader invests by using money or property already
acquired through prior investments or through the proceeds from his or
her trade or business. The short-term trader generates income through
original income-producing activities.
Full-time gambling has the same characteristics as high-volume,
short-term trading. The gambler makes a large number of bets which
have an outcome in a very short time. The period between the placing
of a bet and its payoff may be as short as a few minutes and usually is
no longer than a few days. In essence, the full-time gambler, like the
short-term trader, generates income through his or her own activities.
The focus of the Supreme Court's analysis in Higgins is the nature
of the income-producing activity.9 6 The continuity, regularity, and extent of the taxpayer's efforts in pursuing the income-producing activity
are not determinative of trade or business status. 97 An analysis of all
the facts to determine if the income-producing activity is business-like
in nature is the proper approach to solving the trade or business ques-

89. See id.
90. Id. at 218.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75.
92. See generally Groetzinger, 771 F.2d at 274-75.
93. Id. at 275.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 212.
97. See id. at 215, 218.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/10

CASENOTE

19861

tion.9 8 Since the full-time gambler's activity involves the original creation of wealth, by nature his or her activities should be characterized as
"trade or business" activities.
C. The Continuity, Repetition, and Extensiveness of Income-Producing Activity
The United States Supreme Court confronted the second principle
9 In Gilmore
in United States v. Gilmore.1
the taxpayer was president,
principal managing officer, and controlling shareholder of three corporations. 100 During the taxpayer's divorce trial he incurred considerable
expenses to protect these assets from his wife's claims and then sought
to deduct the expenses because they were connected with his trade or
business. 10 1 The Supreme Court held that the connection with the taxpayer's trade or business did not depend upon the consequences of not
incurring the expenses but rather upon the nature of the income-producing activity itself.102
In light of the precedent set out by the Supreme Court in Gilmore,
it would be fruitless for the full-time gambler to argue that if he had
not incurred the expenses connected with his gambling activities he
would not have been able to support himself and his family. 0 3 The
consequences of not incurring the expenses are clearly not determinative.10 4 After examining the Supreme Court's opinion in Gilmore, it
would seem that the Court would also invalidate the Groetzinger livelihood inquiry 10 5 as the sole standard for analyzing the trade or business
issue. The livelihood inquiry focuses upon the consequences of incurring
the expenses: earning a living. Under Gilmore this is not a permissible
inquiry. Nevertheless, the facts and circumstances test and the livelihood inquiry-if used to determine the nature of the activity-can provide a well-reasoned basis for determining trade or business status.
V.

CONCLUSION

The federal circuit courts of appeals are divided as to whether to
use the goods and services test or the facts and circumstances test to
resolve the trade or business issue. 06 The analysis of the trade or business issue by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Groetz-

98. Id.
99. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
100. Id. at 41.
101. Id. at 40, 42.
102. Id. at 48.
103. See id. at 39.
104. Id. at 48.
105. Groetzinger, 771 F.2d at 274.
106. See cases cited supra note 8.
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inger presents a good precedent for using the facts and circumstances
test with a livelihood inquiry. The facts and circumstances test better
implements the purpose of sections 62 and 162 than the goods and services test since it allows a court to determine whether the very nature
of the activity is that of a trade or business. The key is whether the
income-producing activity involves the original creation of wealth or
whether it is characteristically an investment.107 The facts and circumstances test enables a court to make this determination. Although the
facts and circumstances test is less precise and involves the resolution
of more collateral issues than the goods and services test, it is more
readily designed to allow a court to determine if an activity is by nature a trade or business. Therefore, the facts and circumstances test
should be adopted as the standard for determining trade or business
status.
Jeffrey Scott Bolyard

107.

See supra text accompanying note 98.
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